BlockChain Enabled Secure Electronic Auction Platform

computer Enngineering

Biddings are among the oldest economic institutions in place. They have been used since antiquity to sell a wide variety of goods, and their basic form has remained unchanged. In this dissertation, we explore the efficiency of common Biddings when values are interdependent-the value to a particular bidder may depend on information available only to others-and asymmetric. In this setting, it is well known that sealed-bidBiddings do not achieve efficient allocations in general since they do not allow the information held by different bidders to be shared. Typically, in a Bidding, say of the kind used to sell art, the Bidding sets a relatively low initial price. This price is then increased until only one bidder is willing to buy the object, and the exact way this is done varies. In my model a bidder who drops out at some pricecan “re-enter” at a higher price. With the invention of E-commerce technologies over the Internet the opportunity to bid from the comfort of one’s own home has seen a change like never seen before. Within the span of a few short years, what may have begun as an experimental idea has grown to an immensely popular hobby, and in some cases, a means of livelihood, the online Bidding gathers tremendous response every day, all day.With the point and click of the mouse, one may bid on an item they may need or just want, and in moments they find that either they are the top bidder or someone else wants it more, and you’re outbid! The excitement of a Bidding all from the comfort of home is a completely different experience. The levels of comfort may rise soon but the rules to be followed remain the same.

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